Blind Spots

Why the CAF can't change its culture and how to fix it: suggestions of a former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  

By Allan English

“Blind spots” and “unconscious like-me bias” among senior CAF leaders are key factors preventing the Canadian military from making the culture changes necessary to address problems of sexual misconduct, lack of diversity, and other harmful conduct in its ranks, according to Lieutenant General Guy Thibault (retired), Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) from 2013 to 2016, writing in the November–December 2020 edition of Royal Canadian Military Institute’s SITREP magazine. Until these issues are addressed, the “plans and actions” of these leaders “to address diversity, inclusivity and to stamp-out harmful conduct will not likely match the ideals they espouse,” he says. He goes on to say that until senior CAF leaders can acknowledge and find “new ways” to overcome these blind spots and biases, progress on addressing issues of diversity, inclusivity and misconduct “will continue to be frustratingly slow and ultimately place at risk, the trust, respect and the ‘hearts and minds’ of Canadians in their Armed Forces.” 

Just over four years after leaving the VCDS post and retiring from the CAF, Thibault in his article reflects on some of the reasons why Operation Honour failed, why the CAF Diversity Strategy is failing, and why future initiatives requiring culture change will be on the same path to failure. He begins by saying that it took the perspective given by time for him to “more clearly see aspects of ‘systemic racism’” in the CAF. He admits that as VCDS he probably would have reacted in the same way that RCMP Commissioner Brenda Luckie did when she “struggled with the question” of whether she “believed there was ‘systemic racism’” in the RCMP and that he thinks that while VCDS his “gut instinct would have been to go on the defensive” and give an answer similar to hers. He goes on to say that as a result of “blind spots” caused by coming from “a demographic where they have not likely witnessed or experienced the harmful behaviours at issue” and being “mentored and groomed” by those from a similar demographic, the plans and actions of senior CAF leaders to make the long term culture change necessary to deal with the effects of the toxic culture found in some parts of the CAF will not succeed. 

Thibault also explains why this toxic culture persists in parts of the CAF, despite efforts to change it. In a section titled “The Problem of Promoting Leaders ‘Like Me,’” he observes that “the current Senior Officer/Non-Commissioned cadre…is not where it should be after 40+ years of working to increase diversity in the Forces.” The result, he says, is that senior leaders naturally attribute their success to the “skills, experience and qualities” that got them to high ranking posts. Therefore, these leaders mentor, groom, and promote their successors using “an unconscious ‘like-me, similarity bias,’” assuming that these are the qualities and behaviours that constitute exceptional leadership in the CAF.

Because of their backgrounds and “the military’s hierarchical rank and organizational structure combined with overall low levels of representation of women, GLBT and ethnic and racial minorities in the CAF it is not too surprising that most senior leaders are generally under exposed to the perspectives, views, stories and lived experiences of the men and women who routinely experience prejudice, racism and unwanted sexual behaviour,” he says. Therefore, these senior leaders, who are responsible for shaping the CAF’s culture, may not be open to dealing with evidence that challenges their perceptions of the state of the Canadian military. This helps to explain why an internal DND study conducted in 2018 found that some survivors of sexual misconduct still reported not being believed and then being bullied, harassed and singled out by superior officers, leading them to feel “abandoned by the chain of command.”

Thibault’s article also helps to explain why he and “many” of his colleagues “initially had a hard time believing the picture painted by Justice Marie Deschamps in her 2015 report on sexual misconduct as her descriptions of the CF work environment simply did not match our lived experience in the forces.” It also gives us valuable context for the lukewarm reception given to her report by many in the CAF and the statement by General Tom Lawson, the CDS at the time, who said, “I do not accept from any quarter that this type of behaviour is part of our military culture.” While this statement was challenged by many outside the CAF, it clearly reflected the views of many influential leaders in it. These attitudes also help us understand why General Vance reported in the summer of 2016, one year after its implementation, that Operation Honour was “already generating high levels of skepticism” in the CAF. 

While Thibault’s comments refer directly to the CAF, they are relevant to the problems that any organization with a toxic culture, and many have been reported in the media lately, has in trying to change its culture. Leaders tend to gather around them people with similar views and backgrounds. This leadership team then works to maintain the image of the organizational culture they have created by promoting like-minded people, while excluding contrarians. These leadership teams can use a decision making process called “groupthink” where decisions, based only on evidence that supports existing group values, are made to foster harmony, “minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation.” Consequently, comprehensive culture change can be very difficult if not impossible to achieve. As Thibault concludes, only major changes in the demographic of the organization’s leadership will set the stage for necessary major culture change.